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NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL: REVIEW
'
APACHE MISRULE
A BUNGLING AGENT SETS 'fHE
-

MILITARY ARM IN MOTION'
'

'

BY JOHN P. CLUM

The official records heretofore quoted' show that the
San Carlos Police Force had proved itself efficient and
. sufficient in the matter of the enforcement of order and
discipline within their reservation from 187 4 to 1880; that·
the great body of Apaches on that reservation were quiet
and obedient during said period, and that the troops were
'
removed from the reservation in October, 1875, and were
not recalled at any time up to or dming 1880.
There was, however, one serious affair that occurred
during· the period above referred to; the exact causP. of
'
which I have not been able to ascertain. · This was the
breaking away from the reservation of more than half of
the 453 Indians whom I brought over from Ojo Caliente,
N. M., and located in the Gila valley near the San Carlos
sub-agency in May 1877.
In his annual report for 1878, Agent H. L. Hart mentions this outbreak briefly as follows :
'

'

On September 2, 1877, about 300 of the Warm Spring
Indians left the reservation, taking with them a number of
animals belonging to other Indians. They were followed
by the police and Indian volunteers. Nearly all of the
stock they had was captured, thirteen Indians 'killed, and
31 women and children brought back as prisoners by the
different parties that went in pursuit. The Warn1, SpTing
Indians· shoTtly after surrender-ed to the milita-ry authorities
at Fort Wingate, New Mexico, and have since been fed as
prisoners of war at Hot Springs, New Mexico.
1.

Copyrighted 1930.

2.

"The

~an

Carlos Ap·nche- Police" in 1\r. M. H. Rt!V., lV. C7·':12.
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'
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This record is supplemented by Brig. Gen. John Pope
in his annual report dated OCtober 4, 1878, as follows:
The Apaches, who broke away last year from the San
Carlos agency, in Arizona, and were recaptured by the
troops from this Department, are no-vv in process of removal agai11 to the San Carlos agency. They ha1;e gh;en no·
.t1·ouble since they hlliue been reca.ptured, and I think ?VW
give none at the agency to wht:ch they are now en. ro·z&te.
·Agent Hart does not give any reason why these Indians
left the reservation; neither does he intimate that the truants resisted their pursuers, nor that they committed any
depredations prior to their "surrender" at. Fori Wingate,
New Mexico.
General Pope says these Indians were "recaptured,"
but he does not give any details concerning this achievement
by his troops. He simply says that after the "recapture"
they did not give anyone any trouble, and he did not think
they would give anyone any trouble in the future - thu,s record1~ng ht~s official declamtion that these Indians ·were
peaceable, orde1·ly and obedient, and that he believed they
IOOUld re1?1.(J/in so.
I have already presented an account of my removal of
these Indians in 1877." ·At that time they readily agreed
to'go to San Carlos, and thei1' conduct during the progre~s of
that removal was peaceable, orderly and obedient. Then
why did a majority of this tribe break away from .the reservation on Sept. 2, 1877? It will be remembered that I
discovered
a severe case of small-pox the morning
.
. . . ·we left
Ojo Caliente, and that other cases.. developed while en rmite
to Arizona, and I recall that the disease persisted with more
or less fatal effect among this band for some time after
their arrival at San Carlos. · Inasmuch as these Indians
fled from the reservation less than four months after their
~

'

3. See N. M. Hist. Rev ..

III.

26-39.

•
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arrival, and only two months after -rn?) retirement as q,gent,
it is not improbable that they grew restive because of the
direful effects of the small-pox and a 'belief that their new
location was ~mhealthful, and, taking advantage of the un, settled conditions incident to the change of agents, that a
majority of the Warm Spring band fled 'from the reservation in the hope that they might thus escape from the ra?Jages of the dreaded disease.
The fact that the Warm Spring Apaches were removed to San Carlos in the spring of 1877 without the
slightest difficulty, and the further fact that "about 300"
of these same Indians gave no trouble while UJ1der the
surveillance of the New Mexico troops from Septeu~ber,
1877, to October, 1878, would seem to justify General Pope's
opinion that lth;ey would give no trouble in' the future provided, of course, that they were given firm, intelligent,
and sympathetic ~irection. The above facts would also
seem to ,justify the conclusion that the very se1·ious trouble
experienced ~oith the Warm Spring Indians and Chiricahua
Indians between 1881 and 1886 was the direct result of
flagrant mis-rule.
During the summer of 1881 Agent Tiffany committed
· a stupid and stupendous administrative blunder which interrupted the seven years of peace, spread consternation and
unrest throughout the reservation, and precipitated an out-·
break of· the Chiricahuas, the penalties and sacrifices for
which were suffered and endured by the pioneer citizens
of Arizona and New Mexico and the mass of orderly disposed Apaches upon the reservation for more than a decade
thereafter.
This miserable blundering was of a two-fold character.
His first grave offence was his failure to send the San
Carlos Agency Police to quell an alleged threatened uprising in the northern section of the reservation, instigated
by a fanatical Apache medicine-man,' and his second -

I

,'

4.

See N. M. Hist. Rev., III. 127-130.
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and much graver - offence, was the despatch of an official communication to . the commanding officer at Fort
Apache on· August 14th, demanding that troops be sent
upon the reservation for police duty- in the matter of the
arrest of the insubordinate hoo-hoo medicine-man.
'
This demand was complied with and N ock-e-da-klinny,
the medicine-man, was · arrested· without resistance on
August 30 and conveyed part way to Fort Apache, but
when the troops halted for the night the camp was attacked
by some of their own Indian scouts, and in the fight that
ensued Captain E. C. Hentig, four soldiers, and the Indian
medicine-man were killed, and three soldiers fatally wounded. It was inevitable that the news of this clash between
the mutinous scouts and the troops would cause much excitement, and even alarm among the _White Mountain
Apaches, but they did noJ indulge in any acts of insubordi- .
nation.
These exceedingly disastrous results were accomplished
the ·very .first day the troops were invited back upon the·
reservation for police duty. And although there was no outbreak of the White Mountain Apaches, and no hostiles upori
the reservation, except the small faction of mutinous military scouts belonging to the detachment stationed at Fort
Apache, the most alarming rumors of an impending Apaehe
war were broadcast throughout the country. Forthwith,
General Willcox, commanding the Department of Arizona,
telegraphed to the east and to the west for reinforcements,
with the result that twenty-two companies of troops .:_
eleven from New . Mexico and eleven from California
(which included three batteries of artillery)-were rushed
into Arizona "on detached service against hostile Apaches."
.I was then publishing the Epitaph at Tombstone, and I well
remember the military blare that the Apache.<; were to be
expected..
']'he military arm had been set in motion ·with a vengeance. The troops concentrated in the Gila valley at San
'

,
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Carlos and Camp Thomas, a~d were maneuvered so effee,
tively that they succeeded in driving Geronimo, Hoo, and
Nah-chee, with their bands of Chiricahuas from the reser~ation on September 30 - exa~tly one month after the
t?·oops had been returned to the 1·eservation for the specific .
purpose of arresting the nwdicine-nw.n on the Cibicu, s_ixty
or seventy miles distant from the Chiricahuct cctmp 'at the
sub-agency on the Gila.
The annual report submitted by Agent Tiffany for 1881
is dated "September sixth" .,....- just one week after the fatal
'
clash between the troops and the Indians in the Cibicu country. From that report we quote the following paragraph:

I
l

\
I

I

I

J

The police force of scouts have been, as usual, very efficient
and useful; indeed, this agency could not be kept in its present quiet state withm~t them. They fear no danger, are
quick and obedient, have rendered efficient service in breaking up tiswin parties, and have destroyed at least 2000
gallons of this villainous drink. They have scouted this
reservation as it never has been policed before, and the
force is a terror to evil-doers and run-aways.' I have too
few of them. Too much praise cannot be given them,·
The above enthusiastic endorsement of the agency
police was penned by Agent Tiffany only a few days after
the troops, at his request, had entered the reservation for
di.1ty that should have been performed by the agency police;
· an officer, seven soldiers, and the medicine-man had been
killed upoh the reservation by Apaches; twenty-two companies of troops were being rushed to Arizona as reinforcement to aid in quelling an alleged uprising among Indians
belonging to the San Carlos agency; a:nd yet the agent
blithely prociaims that "the agency could not be kept in its
j:iresent qidet state without them ( the agency police)."
Particular attention is also invited to the extraordinary
fact that although this annual report was of considerable
length, Agent Tiffany has not recorded therein any details
of the. very important and disastrous· events relative to
'

)

'

I
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the a.lleged
u]Yrisin.iJ
aim on:/ the Wh1~te Mountain
hidia-;zs -in:-.
. .
. .
. . .
spired by Nock-e-da-l~linny, or of the officia.l action ialcen
by him~if any-:-for the purpose of apprehending the vicious
1riedicine-ma1t and quellirtrt the disturbance. He does not give
'

tb{slightest hint as to ·w'hy he did not send the agency police
to.. arrest :Nock-e-da-klinny.
.
. instead of demanding th~t th~
troops at Fort Apache should be senfupon the reservation
for that purpose. In fact, .· the very unfortunate . situation
.
thrust .upon the White
Mountain Apaches as a result of
.
. the
monstrous blunder of thdr. agont was referred to .only twice
in this 1'etiort - and thi:m only in the most indifferent and
dsual maimer .
. At the beginning he .says that he must write his report ''from t{me to time as opportunity offers, for the. rea-·
son that besides the regular business of the agency, the.
TFlliite Jl.f Mlintn'/n dLstu.rbance enrtrosses ···m.nch time and atten.tion," and in the concluding; paragraphs referri;.g to ~rop~
.
. . .. .
. .
. . .
.
. .
.
re.turns he says, "many fields .were abandoned, caused by the .
Ol1tbrea~ of the White Mountain "Indians," and also that'
. "rnany fields were destrqyed by the military camping on
them and feeding whole commands for days."
However, Agent Tiffany has inadvertently told us that
· al1·eady the orderly a.nd indust-rious IndianS were paying the
penalties for the recent invasion of the troops...:._ at his re-·
quest- through the loss of the crops the1j ha,d planted and
mlti1Jated in the fields that were abandoned because of the
disturbance, o'l" that had been used as ca.mping gromuls by·
the military.
I have made extensive references to the annual report
of Agent Tiffany for 1881 for the purpose of impressing·
the fact that I have searched in vain for some statement
by the agent in explanation of his action in ignoring the
agency police and in calling upon the troops to arrest the
insubordinate medicine-man -- an action which I have always denounced as absolutely . unnecessary and most disas- ·
trous to all concerned.
'

'

.

14·4

,

'

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
\

/

Obviously, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Price had
been advised of the signs of unrest among the White Moun. tain Indians, and in his· annual report for 1881 he says that
in June of that year considei:able excitement was occasio11ed
among these Indians by the proposition of N ock-e-da-klinny
to bring to life certain deceased warriors - provided the
Indians made him numerous and valuable gifts in the form
of horses, blankets, etc., and' that the a,gent remonstrnted
~vith the lndians on the ground of. the folly of the thingand the waste of their goods. The commissioner further
states that both the. agent and the military authorities at
Fort Apache feared that the medicine-man was working
on the supersitions of the Indians to bring· about an outbreak.
·
Up there on Cibicu Creek, less than a day's journey
from the San Carlos agency, an old Indian began to "maJce
medicine"- and some trouble. To me the story
is strange
'
and weird - but exceedingly interesting, for in all my experience with the Apaches I never knew a so-called "medi- .
cine-man" who exerted any influence - except upon his
unfortunate patient whom he tortured with his rattle and
his moans and groans.
But it appears that Nock-e-da-klinny did create some
excitement with his preposterous medicine babble - thus
making himself an offender against the good. order and
discipline of the reservation. Albert Sterling, chief of the
agency police, made an investigation of conditions on the
Cibicu and reported the situation as "very serious,'~ but no
steps were taken to quell the disturbance. · Every circumstance confirms the opinion that upon receipt of the first
news of the disturbance on the Cibicu the San Carlos Police
sh.2W,d have been sent to the camp of the medicine-man with
positive orders to arrest him -r~live, IF CONVENIENT.
In any emergency the police force could have been augmented to whatever strength the undertaking seemed to demand. When I removed the Chiricahuas from Apache Pass

-
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in 1876 I had with me a company of 54 Apache police, but
these were ''special" - the regular agency force numbered
25, and these remained at San Carlos for service on the
reservation. Again, when I went into New Mexico in 1877
on the trail of Geronimo I had with me 100 Apache police- also "special.'? Likewise, in the summer of. 1881 a suJficient force of agency police should have been despatched
with positive orders to arrest this dell}ded medicine-man,
- and if the
arrest had been ordered early
.
. in this. hoo-doo
medicine game there would have been no 'serious trouble.
Eventuall11. the ' arrest was made without resistance. ·
But this potent agency police force was ignored in this
vital gffair while the agent "REMONSTRATED" with the
Indian dupe~. If, instead of remonstrations, the agent had
executed a few vigorous demonstrat?:ons 'vith his agency
police in the immediate presence of old N ock-e-da-klinny he
would have preserved the peace on the reservation and obviated the ugly pages of the "Cibicu war" and its distressing
sequ~mces. Unhappily, the many and severe penalties which
resulted
from the agent's weakness. in this affair were
.
.
vis£ted upon the Apaches and not upon himself.
Commissioner Price ( 1881) also says: "Several of the
mutino1ls (Fort Apache) scouts had been ar1·ested and
hrnnqht in by the aqenCJJ Indian police force and delivr;red
up to the m1:lita.ry." The San Carlos Police were.not allo·wed
to make the arrest· of the medicine-man
· · b1d after the
militCLry had been called in and some of their own scouts
had mutinied and precipitated the shooting which resulted
in the death of Captain Hentig, seven soldiers, and the
medicine-man; after the seven years of peace on the reservation
had been broken, and the Indians thoroughly excited,
..
.
and actual trouble begun; then - then, mark you, the
agency police were called upon to apprehend the mutinous
military scouts -. AND THEY GOT 'EM.
It is interesting to note that Lieutenant W. H. Carter,
Sixth Cavalry, U. S. A., who led the troops a1oa,u from the
l

I
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San Carlos .reservation ·on October 27, 1875,' .was one of the
officers who led the troops back· upon the reservation on
August 30, 1881. At that time Captain Adna R. Chaffee
was also serving with the Sixth Cavalry in Arizona. · Some
.years later we find Lieutenant Carter's name enter~d in
the army roster as Major General Carter, and at the same
time Captain Chaffee has become Lieutenant General Chaffee- in command of the United States Army.
In December, 1917, three years after the death of General Chaffee,. Major General Carter published a volume en.
titled, "The Life of Lieutenant General Chaffee." \Ve are
fortunate, therefore, in having this unofficial military record to aid us in arriving at the truth regarding several
events in the history of the Apaches wh~ch GeneraLCarter
.has recorded with more or less detail in his story of the life
of General Chaffee.
The conditions and circumstances which led· to the
fatal clash in the Cibicu country between the troops and
the mutinous scouts .on August 30, 1881, are' presented by
General Carter as follows:
··

During the summer. of 18~1 .there appeared 3mong the
White Mountain Apaches a medicine-man named Nock-e
-daklinny, who proclaimed himself the messiah. The oracle
gradually influenced the minds of the Indians and became so
infatuated with his success that he appeared to believe the
truth of. his own weird dreams. So long as he confined
himself to ordinary. incantations there was no cause. for
anxiety. In common with more civilized charletans, however, he had gradually mulcted his faithful believers of
much of their limited wealth.
It is neither expedient nor profitable to discuss an aimless policy which permitted· license to run riot on the reservation until the Indians grew sullen and insubordinate.
The regimental commander was at Fort Apache. Recognizing the very serious turn of affairs, he summoned the
mediCine-man and several ·prominent chiefs' and heads of
·families and explained to them the futility of rising' against
the whites. The author ·was present at all the interviews.

(

I

•
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·The advice and warnings given: Nock-e~da-klinne fell on
deaf ears, and he returned to his camp about forty mile$
back in the Indian country, where he spurned the orders of
the agent to report himself at San Carlos. The deluded
Indians followed him, and the excitement grew widespread .
. · The titne for parley and· remonstrance ended when ·the
agent made a formal de'mand that the military arm be set
in motion and that the recalcitrant medicine-man be brought
before him dead or alive.
·
The story of the march, the arrest, the attempt at rescue, the hand-to-hand combat, constitutes an interesting ·
page in th·e regimental history. While the medicine-man lay
mortally wounded, after the rescuers had been driven off
and we were preparing to bury our dead, the author examined the body and took from its receptacle the pass by
authority of which Nock-e-da-klinne left the agency. The
pass had expired, and the deluded messiah had repeatedly
refused to return and report himself as was required of all
reservation Indians.
··
.
There was a short, sharp campaign, but the failure of
the messiah to come back to life, as he had promised to do if
killed, cooled the ardor of the White Mountain Apaches,.
and they rapidly drifted back to their reservation camps.
Troops of the regiment made rapid marches through all
the exposed districts, gradually concentrating at and near ·
the agency., where, for some unexplained reason, the wild
Chiricahuas of Ju (Hoo) and Geronimo, who were at th~
San Carlos agency, fled toward Mexico, leaving a trail of
blood and piilage to mark their hurried flight.
General Carter well knew that ever since he led th~
troops away from San Carlos in 1875, the agency police had
maintained order and discipline throughout the reservation, · / '
and it was the failure of Agent Tiffany to employ that force
promptly .and effectively at the first signs of unrest •1mong
the India~ns on the Cibicu ·that General Carter justly condemns when he says: "It is neither expedient nor profitable
io discuss an aimless policy which permitted license to run
riot on the reservation until the Indians grew sullen and
insubordinate."
w

•

-

•
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Agent
Tiffany's demand
that "the military arm be set
.
.
'
in motion" against the insubordinate medicine-man was
dated August 14th, and it was between that date and Augu~t
30th that General
the medicine-man and
. Carr "summoned
.
several prominent chiefs and heads of families'! for a c~nference, in the hope that order might be restored without
recourse to force. But this proved of no avail and Nocke-da-klinny returned to his camp "where he spurned the
orders of the agent to report hhnself at San Carlos."
And then on August 30th, after the fight and while the
medicine-man lay mortally wounded, General Carter took
from his body "the pass by anthority of which Nock-e-daklinny left the agency. The pass had expired, and the delnded messiah had repeatedly refused to report himself, as
was required of all reservation Indians."
General Carter's account of the "short, sharp campaign" which followed the fight in the Cibicu country clear-·
ly indicates that there was no actWJl nprising a1nong the
White Monntain Indians, and that when the medicine-man
was killed the distnrbance died with him, for, as the general says, "the failure
of the messiah to. come back to life,
.
as he had promised to do· if killed, cooled the ardor of the
White Mountain Apaches and they rapidly drifted back to
their resen;ation camps."
The 1 annual report of Major General Irvin McDowell .
dated at the Presidio, San Francisco, Cal., October 14, 1881,
contains the following .interesting comments:
The fact of the troops finding the medicine-man with his
people in their· homes, 1ohet·e they had been planting cqrn,
shows they were not then for war. I cannot concur, therefore, in denouncing their cond·U:ct as treacherons (excepting
the military scouts) .
·
_.,

On August 17th Colonel Carr sent· the following. telegram to General McDowell :

I
I

•
J
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I had directed Lieutenant· Cruse to take the guns of his
scouts
on the 14th instant, and to say that
.
. after inspection
.
he would keep them in his office out of the wet. They
have been kept there :much of the time heretof()re .. The
scouts did not like it, and this time considered it a sign
of distrust, but I could not reconcile it to my duty to have
them keep their arms when there was so much and so geneml belief in their disposition to treachery.
'

General. McDowell quotes this telegram in his report
and then makes the following caustic comment:
The temper of his Indian scouts being such as to rnake
it his duty to disarm them, thus causing them to feel they
were distrusted; the belief in their disposition to treachery
being general, and that they could only be relied on till the
next pay-day; it was injudicious, as events have shown, in
Colonel Cm·r to take them, with arms in their hands, to aid
him in the a1·rest of one of their leaders,
Thus ~t is'made plain that if Agent Tiffany had sent the
dependable Agency police to arrest Nock-e-da-klinny; the
opportunity would not. ha-ve been created for Colonel Carr
· ·~o make his very grievous blunder of taking, as a part of
his force, the armed scouts whom he felt were in sympathy
with and under. the spell of the defiant medicine-man. It is
not remarkable that the combined blunders of the agent and·
the commanding officer shpuld have precipitated actual
trouble.
Brig. Gen. John Pope, in his annual report dated September 22, 1881, comments on the Cibicu episode thus:
I was at the time in Santa Fe, N; M,, where 1 had reasona.bly good opportunity to know quite fully the facts. Colonel
Carr marched to the Indian village and arrc.sted the rncdi.:.
cine-man without resistance. He then marched back five or
six n~iles in the direction of the post (Fort Apache) and
encamped for the night, intending to return to the post the
next day.

'

I
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IShortly after he reached his camp-some of the ·Indian

scout~

belonging to _his command cam~ into the camp where
the medicine-man was a prisoner. Captain Hentig ordered
them ito leave camp, and as he did so he turned to pick
his rifle, upon which the scouts, or some of them, fired a
volley upon him, killing him and four enlisted men and
wounding several others. .
. ...
The day after _his return to the post (September .1st),
Carr sent out a party to bury the men wounded the day
before and who had since died, and while engaged in this
servic'e the party was fired on by Indians. Lieut .. Gordon
was wounded. The fire was returned by the party anrl the
Indians driven off.
.
· Sjnce that time no Indians have been seen, ·nor ha?Je
they, so far as I can learn, committed any depredations or
other acts of hostility.· The whole affair had much the appearance of a sudden and altogether unpremeditated flurry,
and would probably never have occurred but for the firing
of the .Indian scouts on Hentig. There was certainly no
·
concerted action or prearranged attack. ·
It became known that the whole affair had been grossly
exaggerated. The Navajoes showed no sort of purpose to
be troublesome, nor to join the White Mountain Apaches,
nor, ~ndeed, did any other Indians in Arizona or New
Mexico. The last telegrams from General Willcox are to
the effect that all the supposed hostiles are surrenclering
without firing a shot 'or offering any resistance, a fact ind~:.
eating very clearly that the so-called attack on Cara· was
the result of temporary excitement, and bore no marks
whate.ver of premeditation or intention to begin general
hostilities.

up

General 0. B. Willcox, commanding the Department
of Arizona, dated his annual report from Tucson, Arizona,
October 12, 1881, in which he said: ·
The immediate cause of the attack on Colonel Carr vvas
the arrest of the medicine-man. The remote causes ar~
unknown, as no grievances had ever been complained of by
the White Mountain Apaches.
·
. .
•

I

\

I
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And yet, in the face of these facts, General Willcox
tells us that additional- troops were ordered to re-inforce
,Fort Apache as early as August 13th; that these "troops
were
ordered forward from
.
. points below and west of Camp
Thomas," and that ."on August 17th Colonel Carr reported
that Pedro, Santo and other Indians were alwrmed about a
a BIG GUN a,nd more troops ·were coming to
1·eport that
· Fort Apache."
And more troops did come to Fort Apache- ELEV~N
COMPANIES from New Mexico: "Three companies of infantry and two troops of cav~lry from Fort Wingate, with
surplus ammunition," and these were followed by Colonel
MacKenzie with six companies of the 4th Cavalry. The
troops
from Fort. Wingate arrived .at Fort Apache on Sep.
tember 24th, and Colonel MacKenzie and hts troopers
reached that post one day later - Sept. 25th. In addition
to the' troops from New Mexico ELEVEN COMPANIES
were sent in from California.
.
The "military arm" had been "set in motion" and it
'
·was necessary for the Commander of the Department of
Arizona to make an official showing (at least on paper) vt
the necessity for and the use made of the reinforcements
which, had been sent in response to his telegraphic appeal
for help. · This em·ergency was courageously met by General
Willcox in his annual report above referred to from which
we quote the following paragraph:
'

•

The troops were moved to the Cibicu country in such manner and time as to drive the hostiles from their strongholds
into the folds of the reser.vation without a fight, and ihe
White Mountain Indians have not struck another blow.
That reads like one of the stories in the back part or
an old "Webster's Spelling- Book" and is reasonably fair
press agent material for· consumption abroad, but as military history it is (if we say it softly) .at least misleading .

l
~
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The honest-to-goodness facts are that the "strongholds'' of
these Indians were their corn fields, and .these were in· the
"Cibicu country" - all of 1vhich i.s entirely and completely
and almost centrally within "the folds of the reservatt"orz,.''
General McDowell has pointed out that the 'troops under
Colonel Carr found "the medicine-man
with his people in
·.
their homes, where they had been planting con1 -and Colonel Carr's command represented the only troops "moved to
the Cibicu country." Furthermore, in the same report General Willcox tells us that these.Ind·ians never had complained o.f
any grievances, and then, unceremoniously, he designates
them as "hostiles" whom he drove "from their strongholds."
Also, we have just above quoted a telegram from General
Willcox to General Pope stating that all of the "supposed
hostiles surrendered without firing a shot or offering any
resistance." Even the statement that "the White Mountain
Indians have not struck another blow" is misleading for the
reason that the only "blow" struck did not come from the
mass of these Indians, but from the suspected scouts-and
that blow with its disastrous results would have been avoid-·
ed .if Colonel Carr had disarmed his distrusted scouts and
forbidden them to accompany him into the Cibicu country.
But "the military arm" had been "set in motion" and
some dramatic and spectacular results must be reported,
even though, later, it should become known "that the whole
affair had been grossly exaggerated," as General Pope has
observed.
And these exaggerated spectacular reports apparently
excited General Sherman,· then Commander-in-chief of the
, Army - so much so that he became quite savage himself,
and under date of Washington, D. C., September 29, 1881,
he sent the following telegram :
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It would be well for the Apaches at the San Carlos agency

to realize that at any time_the troops in Arizona can
promptly be, reinforced ftom the north and ea~t. Soon~r
or later some. considerable nu.m,ber of these A.paches tctll:
have to be killed by bullets rather than by Tope.
It appears that General Willcox brooded a whole year

over this telegram from his Commander-in-chief, with the
result that in his annual report dated August 31, 1882, he
enlarges upon the difficulties attending the alleged situation
in and around the Cibicu country during September, 1881,
- on account of which he says:
We were unable to strike the savages such a blow in actual
battle as the Geneml of_ the ATmy demanded, and as the
country ardently looked for - no JnoTe. than I did myself.

With the vicious mental attitude towaTd the Apaches as
above officially expressed by the Commander-in~chief of the
Army, and the Commander of the Department of Arizona,,
we m,ay- ask, in all seTiousness, what chance had these Indians for fair play, or any progress in their general welfare,
when "the military arm" had once been "set ·in motion"
against them? ·However, it should be remembered that ·
General Sherman was not fully advised as to the actual
facts when he sent his savage telegram to General McDowell, while General Willcox was in command in the field
of "operations" and had a· whole year in which to evolve
his report.
(To be concluded)

